Milo Raahauge posted an update 7 months, 1 week ago
Discuss in more detail below, this may happen if exploiters deter mutualists, as in some ant-protection mutualisms [77,78] and seed-dispersal mutualisms . In other cases, the exploiter may always interact with the shared partner after the mutualist does, whichPLOS Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pbio.February 3,5 /Box 2. Key Concepts from Social Evolution TheoryStudies of intraspecific cooperative interactions, dar.12324 particularly in social groups, have yielded a large body of theory that predicts when conflict should arise over acquiring more resources for oneself versus cooperatively providing them to others, and who the recipients of cooperative resource provision should be. Some of these models of cooperation and conflict have been widely applied to interspecific mutualism, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [55,56], while the importance of many other concepts for understanding mutualism has been overlooked . Here we highlight three concepts from social evolution that provide a rationale for the predictions we make about temporal sequences in mutualism, and that stress underlying similarities between intraspecific and interspecific cooperation.Diminishing returns and tolerated theftPrediction about temporal sequences in mutualism: Once benefits have already been acquired from a mutualist, the cost of subsequently being exploited is likely to be low (except for direct reproductive costs). Insight from social evolution: Many social groups are characterized by diminishing returns of investing in cooperation or in conflict or exploitation . A large investment in cooperation may produce disproportionately little benefit if only a threshold number of individuals is needed to produce a shared resource. An example is jir.2010.0108 when a group of migrating animals requires a single leader : as the leader pays an extra cost but gains no additional benefit, this scenario is the “volunteer’s dilemma” [59,60]. Similarly, a large investment in conflict (that is, obtaining more resources for oneself at the expense of others) may be disproportionately costly (e.g., lethal fighting) compared to a lower investment; this increasing cost of conflict can maintain cooperation in the face of the tragedy of the commons . For example, food sharing in some human societies may have evolved as “tolerated theft:” if, after a big kill, a food owner has more meat than can be used before it spoils, then the cost of defending this food will outweigh the cost of letting MK-5172 site others take it [61,62]. That is, the marginal value of food diminishes with the amount of food [63,64].Signal detection and kin recognitionPrediction about temporal sequences in mutualism: It may be more difficult for the shared partner to discriminate among mutualists and exploiters when they overlap in time, because time cannot be used as a cue to distinguish partner identity . Insight from social evolution: In the theory of animal communication, signals and cues provide information about a properties of the individual providing the signal or cue , and the receiver of the signal must distinguish an informative signal or cue from background noise, or between multiple classes of signal or cue, such as kin versus non-kin . Signal detection theory quantifies the tradeoff between incorrectly responding to an absent signal and incorrectly ignoring a signal that is present; receivers are selected to minimize both false positives and false negatives . When there is greater overlap between differe.